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RECENT DECISIONS

CONFLICT OF LAws-PUBLIC PoLicY OF THE FoRUM A BAR TO WIFE's
ACTION AGAINST HusBAND FOR NEGLIGENT INJURY - Husband and wife
were residents of state A, in which a personal tort action between the spouses
was not recognized. The wife sued in state A for injuries sustained by reason
of her husband's negligent operation of an automobile in state B. Notwithstanding the wife had a right of action under the lex loci delicti,, held, that the
public policy of the forum is an effective bar to an action by the wife against
her husband for personal injuries. (In the record of the case it appears that the
defendant in interest was an insurance company.) Kircher v. Kircher, 288
Mich. 669, 286 N. W. 120 (1939).
The principal case is the third in a group of recent holdings that have
refused to make available the courts of the forum to a wife who was entitled
to sue her husband for personal injuries at the locus delicti. 1 The reasons that
these courts have given to bring the wife's action against her husband within
an exception to the usual conflicts rule seem neither consistent nor adequate.
In West Virginia apparently a mere difference between the foreign law and the
law of the forum will justify the court's refusal to entertain a foreign cause of
action; and no distinction is made between the ordinary public policy that determines what shall be the local law and the public policy that militates against the
enforcement of a foreign right. 2 But the American auth9rities are generally agreed
that the ordinary policy of the local law should give way to "The fundamental
public policy •.• that rights lawfully vested shall be everywhere maintained." 8
The New York court, on the other hand, has worked out an exception in the
husband-and-wife personal injury situation by excluding the wife, not on grounds
of public policy but because she is under a procedural disability to sue her husband.4 "Procedure" has been defined by a learned writer as relating to the
process or machinery by which facts are made known to the courts. 5 One is at a
loss to discover what additional machinery a court requires to hear a personal
injury action between the spouses over that which it customarily employs in
hearing contract and property actions.6 In the principal case the Michigan court
reasons that it is not obliged to invoke the doctrine of comity in aid of the
wife because her foreign right of action is against the public policy of the forum.
But the "comity" by which a foreign right is enforced in the courts of the forum
is a binding rule of law, and it does not invest the court with a broad personal
1 The other two cases are Poling v. Poling, II6 W. Va. 187, 179 S. E. 604
(1935); and Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936).
ZPoling v. Poling, II6 W. Va. 187, 179 S. E. 604 (1935). This is also the
English rule. The Halley, L. R. 2 Priv. Counc. 193 (1868).
8 Cardozo, J., in Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N. Y. 99 at II3,
120 N. E. 198 (1918), quoted in GoooRICH, CoNFLICT OF LAWS 234, note 54
(1938); CoNFLICT OF LAws RESTATEMENT, § 612, comment (1934); Loucks v.
Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198 (1918); Eskovitz
v. Berger, 276 Mich. 536, 268 N. W. 883 (1936).
4 Mertzv. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 597 (1936).
11 Lorenzen, "The Statute of Frauds and the Conflict of Laws," 32 YALE L. J.
3n at 325 (1923), quoted in GoooRicH, CoNFLICT OF LAws 189, note 2 (1938).
6 A note, 50 HARV. L. REv. 351 (1936), points out that the New York court in
the Mertz case has taken a somewhat strained view of what constitutes procedure.
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discretion. 7 While decisions are cited illustrative of the public policy against
personal tort actions between husband and wife where the wrong was committed in Michigan, 8 no reason is given why the prosecution of a corresponding foreign right would violate the public policy of the forum. It is questionable
whether the court's desire to aid conjugal peace should be carried to the extent
of denying a resident wife the enforcement of her foreign right of action. In
Michigan, property actions between husband and wife 9 are recognized under
the Married Women's Property Act,1° and it would seem that personal tort
actions between husband and wife are but one step removed. Attempts have
been made to rationalize these decisions on the theory that the real public
interest being protected by the courts is the danger of collusive suits between
happily married spouses who are primarily interested in mulcting an insurance
company. But in none of the three opinioµs here considered was this point
touched upon; and, further, in all the cases the insurer might have expressly
provided for such a contingency in the policy.
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7 Beach, "Uniform Interstate Enforcement of Vested Rights," 27 YALE L. J. 656
(1918); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co. of New York, 224 N. Y. 99, 120 N. E. 198
(1918).
8 Harvey v. Harvey, 239 Mich. 142, 214 N. W. 305 (1927); Riser v. Riser,
240 Mich. 402, 215 N. W. 290 (1927).
9 Markham v. Markham, 4 Mich. 305 (1856) (but note that in Michigan a wife
may not sue her husband to enforce a purely executi:>ry contract); Jenne v. Marble,
37 Mich. 319 (1877). In general, see dissenting opinion of Crouch, J., in Mertz
v•. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 3 N. E. (2d) 594 (1936).
10 3 Mich. Comp. Laws (1929), § 13057, enacted in 1855.

